Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2)
Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2) 是什么?
Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2)A 2022 evolution of the Industroyer/CrashOverride electric-grid malware, attributed by ESET to Sandworm and used in an unsuccessful April 2022 attempt to cut power in a Ukrainian regional utility.
Industroyer2 is a 2022 ICS malware sample attributed by ESET and CERT-UA to Russia's Sandworm group, used in a 8 April 2022 attempt to disrupt a Ukrainian high-voltage substation. It is a leaner, single-target evolution of the 2016 Industroyer / CrashOverride malware that caused a Kyiv power outage. Industroyer2 implements the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol directly, with the target substation's IEC-104 endpoints and addresses hard-coded into the binary, indicating that the operator had performed long-running reconnaissance and obtained engineering data before deployment. The intended outcome — opening circuit breakers in a coordinated manner to cause a regional blackout — was prevented by Ukrainian defenders and ESET researchers in time. The campaign also delivered destructive wipers (CaddyWiper, Industroyer2-paired ORCSHRED/AWFULSHRED/SOLOSHRED scripts) to make recovery harder. Industroyer2 is the clearest public example of state-sponsored grid-targeted malware actually used in a kinetic conflict.
● 示例
- 01
The April 2022 Industroyer2 attack on a Ukrainian regional electric utility was thwarted by defenders before circuit-breaker manipulation succeeded.
- 02
An OT NDR vendor publishes a YARA rule that detects Industroyer2's hard-coded IEC 60870-5-104 station address structure in suspect binaries.
● 常见问题
Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2) 是什么?
A 2022 evolution of the Industroyer/CrashOverride electric-grid malware, attributed by ESET to Sandworm and used in an unsuccessful April 2022 attempt to cut power in a Ukrainian regional utility. 它属于网络安全的 OT / ICS / 物联网 分类。
Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2) 是什么意思?
A 2022 evolution of the Industroyer/CrashOverride electric-grid malware, attributed by ESET to Sandworm and used in an unsuccessful April 2022 attempt to cut power in a Ukrainian regional utility.
Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2) 是如何工作的?
Industroyer2 is a 2022 ICS malware sample attributed by ESET and CERT-UA to Russia's Sandworm group, used in a 8 April 2022 attempt to disrupt a Ukrainian high-voltage substation. It is a leaner, single-target evolution of the 2016 Industroyer / CrashOverride malware that caused a Kyiv power outage. Industroyer2 implements the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol directly, with the target substation's IEC-104 endpoints and addresses hard-coded into the binary, indicating that the operator had performed long-running reconnaissance and obtained engineering data before deployment. The intended outcome — opening circuit breakers in a coordinated manner to cause a regional blackout — was prevented by Ukrainian defenders and ESET researchers in time. The campaign also delivered destructive wipers (CaddyWiper, Industroyer2-paired ORCSHRED/AWFULSHRED/SOLOSHRED scripts) to make recovery harder. Industroyer2 is the clearest public example of state-sponsored grid-targeted malware actually used in a kinetic conflict.
如何防御 Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2)?
针对 Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2) 的防御通常结合技术控制与运营实践,详见上方完整定义。
Industroyer2 (CrashOverride 2) 还有哪些其他名称?
常见的别称包括: Industroyer 2, CrashOverride 2。
● 相关术语
- ot-iot№ 588
Industroyer / CrashOverride
模块化的 ICS 恶意软件,用于 2016 年乌克兰电网攻击,并于 2022 年以 Industroyer2 升级出现,可直接使用电网原生协议跳闸变电站。
- ot-iot№ 587
工业控制系统 (ICS)
用于自动化和监控工业过程的系统统称,包括 SCADA、DCS、PLC、RTU 和安全控制器。
- ot-iot№ 1083
SCADA
数据采集与监控系统,从远程现场设备收集遥测数据,使运营人员能够监视并操作大型工业过程。
- ot-iot№ 1229
Stuxnet
2010 年披露的高复杂度蠕虫,通过重编程西门子 PLC 破坏伊朗铀浓缩离心机,普遍被归因于美国与以色列。
- ot-iot№ 1297
TRITON / TRISIS
2017 年发现的恶意软件,针对沙特一座石化工厂的施耐德 Triconex 安全仪表系统,被归因于与俄罗斯有关联的攻击者。
- ot-iot№ 854
运营技术 (OT)
用于监控和控制物理过程、设备和基础设施(如工厂、发电厂和公用事业)的硬件与软件。
● 参见
- № 570IEC 61850